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Reviews of Kiribati, Nauru, Northern 
Marianas, and Palau are not included 
in this issue.
Federated States  
of Micronesia
The Federated States of Microne-
sia (FSM) enjoyed a season of calm 
 during the period under review, 
certainly in contrast to the tumult of 
recent years. But in foreign relations, 
the  federation grappled with tempera-
mental and  tempestuous regional 
and international forces, even as it 
attempted to enhance its stature as a 
constructive member of the interna-
tional  community.
Two major developments domi-
nated the foreign side of the ledger for 
the FSM during the period in review: 
the assumption by the FSM govern-
ment of the chair of the Pacific Islands 
Forum, an intergovernmental group-
ing of independent and self- governing 
states in the Pacific (including Austra-
lia and New Zealand) whose stated 
aim is to enhance the economic and 
social well-being of its members 
through cooperation between those 
governments and relevant regional 
and international agencies (pifs 
2017); and an escalation of efforts by 
the Government of Guam to address 
the growing number of inmates 
in Guam prisons from the FSM, 
 including through unprecedented 
and legally questionable means. In 
each situation, the FSM attempted to 
navigate various thorny issues while 
projecting an aura of authority and 
independence, with varying degrees of 
success.
The assumption of the chair of 
the Forum—a one-year term—was a 
diplomatic and political coup for the 
FSM, marking the first-ever chairing 
of the Forum by the FSM govern-
ment, but it was nearly derailed before 
it began. When a Forum member 
assumes the chair, it typically hosts 
all other Forum members in its ter-
ritory for a major annual meeting. 
The gathering is a significant logisti-
cal challenge, where the new chair 
welcomes not just the Forum members 
from the Pacific but also “dialogue 
partners” from around the globe, 
including the United States, China, 
and Japan. The FSM was slated to 
host the forty- seventh meeting of the 
Forum from 7 to 11 September 2016 
in Pohnpei. A few months before the 
meeting, however, FSM government 
officials publicly expressed concerns 
about the logistical capacity of Pohn-
pei to host the meeting, particularly in 
terms of lodging. In response, the FSM 
government asked foreign delega-
tions attending the meeting to limit 
their delegations to heads of state or 
heads of government, their spouses, 
and five support personnel for each 
delegation—a tall task for Forum 
members such as Australia and New 
Zealand, as well as the major dialogue 
partners, all of which typically bring 
large  delegations and hordes of media 
personnel to the annual Forum meet-
ings (kp, 23 June 2016).
By the time the Forum meeting 
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rolled around, the FSM government 
seemed to have addressed the logisti-
cal hassles involved—including by 
enlisting homestays to accommodate 
excess participants—and so the gov-
ernment was able to turn its attention 
to substantive discussions. The meet-
ing’s official theme was “Small and 
Far: Challenges for Growth” (Wyeth 
2016). In addressing the theme, the 
meeting tackled a wide range of 
regional issues, including fisheries, 
maritime surveillance, pacer-Plus 
trade negotiations, the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development, and 
climate change (fsmis, 19 Sept 2016). 
On climate change, the smaller, devel-
oping members of the Forum banded 
together to push for a proposal from 
the Forum to the Green Climate Fund, 
which is a mechanism under the 
United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (unfccc) 
that finances adaptation and mitiga-
tion projects. Stressing the difficulty 
they experience in accessing the Green 
Climate Fund and similar funds, these 
members called on the developed 
members of the Forum (ie, Australia 
and New Zealand) to assist them in 
their efforts to access the funds (rnz 
2016a). Additionally, and of more 
immediate consequence, the Forum 
Leaders endorsed the Framework for 
Resilient Development in the Pacific: 
An Integrated Approach to Address 
Climate Change and Disaster Risk 
Management (frdp). With memo-
ries of widespread devastation from 
Typhoon Maysak and Cyclones Pam 
and Winston still fresh in the minds 
of Forum members, the frdp casts 
climate change and natural disasters 
as potent development challenges and 
calls on Forum members to address 
vulnerabilities to climate change and 
disasters and to mainstream relevant 
management approaches throughout 
their policy making in all sectors, 
 ideally in time for the entry into force 
of the Paris Agreement on climate 
change (pifu 2016a). The FSM gov-
ernment was already well situated to 
carry out the frdp, because the FSM 
had enacted a law in January 2014 
that called on all departments and line 
agencies of the FSM government to 
incorporate climate change and natu-
ral disaster risk management into their 
annual budgeting and policy making 
(fsmis, 9 Jan 2014). The adoption of 
the frdp was an example of the FSM 
government using its position as chair 
of the Forum to push for an issue 
of importance and relevance for the 
FSM—and whose operationalization 
would not be a major new burden for 
the FSM government.
Forum Leaders also adopted the 
Pohnpei Ocean Statement: A Course 
to Sustainability. In acknowledgment 
of the centrality of the ocean to the 
cultures, identities, and livelihoods 
of Forum members, the document 
canvasses various threats to the ocean 
and to its potential uses for sustain-
able economic development, including 
marine pollution; ocean acidification; 
coral reef degradation; and illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated fishing. 
It calls for the enactment and perpetu-
ation of genuine and durable “part-
nerships for action” in relation to 
ocean-based sustainable development, 
as articulated in the samoa Pathway 
adopted by the Third International 
Conference on Small Island Develop-
ing States in 2014 (UN Conference on 
Small Island Developing States 2014). 
The Pohnpei Ocean Statement also 
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endorses the convening of an inter-
governmental conference to negoti-
ate an international legally binding 
instrument to regulate the conserva-
tion and sustainable use of marine 
biological diversity of areas beyond 
national jurisdiction (eg, the high 
seas), in order to address major gaps 
in international ocean governance 
(pifs 2016b). The FSM has been a 
major player in the push for such a 
conference, including in negotiations 
at the United Nations.
In addition to advocating for the 
adoption of two major outcome docu-
ments, the FSM officially joined the 
Smaller Island States (sis), a subgroup 
of Forum members (ie, Cook Islands, 
Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, 
Niue, Palau, and Tuvalu, in addition 
to the FSM) established in 2006 to 
facilitate the provision of technical, 
logistical, and financial assistance 
to Forum members characterized by 
limited development capacities and 
fragile and vulnerable natural environ-
ments (pifs 2016b). FSM President 
Peter M Christian called the induc-
tion of the FSM a “great honour” 
that the FSM had “wanted for a long 
time”  (Maclellan 2016). With the 
FSM seated, the sis tackled several 
critical issues, including the develop-
ment and broadening of regional air 
transport options (eg, Air Niugini and 
Air Nauru service into the FSM) and 
the crafting of a joint proposal of sis 
members to the Green Climate Fund, 
all in accordance with a regional strat-
egy adopted by the sis earlier in 2016 
(pifu 2016b).
The Forum meeting was not all 
smooth sailing, however. The ques-
tion of how to address the self-deter-
mination struggles of the people of 
West Papua tested the ability of the 
FSM as Forum chair to corral diver-
gent views and produce a consensus 
outcome. With various governmental 
and nongovernmental organizations 
in the region pushing for broad and 
sustained involvement of the Forum 
in the issue, there was general recog-
nition among Forum members that 
the Forum meeting in Pohnpei had to 
address the matter in some substantive 
form (rnz 2016b). 
Prior to the holding of the annual 
Forum meeting, the FSM gave a hint 
of how it might approach the issue 
as chair. On 23 August 2016, Presi-
dent Christian received a delegation 
dispatched by the Government of 
Solomon Islands to inform him about 
the Pacific Islands Coalition for West 
Papua (an initiative spearheaded 
by the Prime Minister of Solomon 
Islands, the Honorable Manasseh 
Sogavare), and to invite President 
Christian to attend the inaugural 
meeting of the coalition the follow-
ing week. Solomon Islands has taken 
the lead in recent years in pushing 
for international support for the 
self-determination aspirations of the 
people of West Papua, as well as for 
international condemnation of alleged 
human rights abuses suffered by the 
people of West Papua (including 
bodily harm in addition to the stifling 
of self-determination initiatives) at the 
hands of the Government of Indo-
nesia, the administering authority in 
West Papua (Wyeth 2017). Recogniz-
ing that reality, President Christian’s 
response to the delegation took two 
tacks: On the one hand, self-determi-
nation should be a matter resolved 
internally and with the support and 
involvement of all concerned parties; 
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but on the other hand, human rights 
are universal rights that must not be 
denied to any people, and the interna-
tional community must not condone 
human rights abuses. On the latter 
point, President Christian expressed a 
willingness to support Forum efforts 
to work with the United Nations in 
addressing the alleged human rights 
abuses suffered by the people of West 
Papua (fsmis, 9 Aug 2016). How 
that approach would comport with a 
preference to resolve the West Papua 
situation internally was a tension left 
unresolved by President Christian in 
his remarks to the delegation. Never-
theless, he set the stage for how the 
Forum meeting would address the 
issue of West Papua shortly thereafter.
After extensive discussions on the 
matter, the Forum Leaders issued a 
terse consensus statement. The official 
communiqué from the meeting states 
that Forum Leaders “recognised the 
political sensitivities of the issue of 
West Papua (Papua) and agreed the 
issue of alleged human rights viola-
tions in West Papua (Papua) should 
remain on their agenda. [Forum] 
Leaders also agreed on the importance 
of an open and constructive dialogue 
with Indonesia on the issue” (pifs 
2016a). The statement is notable for 
several reasons (other than its terse-
ness): It does not explicitly mention 
the self-determination aspirations of 
the people of West Papua, it implicitly 
affirms Indonesia’s authority over 
the people of West Papua, and it does 
not recommend a specific way for-
ward on the matter. The tension in 
President Christian’s remarks to the 
delegation from Solomon Islands the 
previous month seemed to have been 
resolved in favor of careful deference 
to Indonesia and internal processes 
rather than substantive involvement of 
the Forum in the matter. The silence 
of the FSM on the issue was notable. 
Indeed, later in September, during the 
opening of the General Debate of the 
71st United Nations General Assem-
bly in New York City, while leaders 
from Solomon Islands, Tonga, Nauru, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Marshall Islands, 
and Palau expressed support for the 
self-determination of the people of 
West Papua and called on the interna-
tional community (including various 
mechanisms in the United Nations) 
to address their alleged human rights 
abuses (Walsh 2016), President Chris-
tian did not mention West Papua in 
his speech to the General Assembly, 
either as chair of the Forum or in his 
national capacity (fsmis, 21 Sept 
2016).
As the FSM government attempted 
to present an assured hand when 
dealing with regional tensions as 
Forum chair, it struggled to handle a 
matter brewing much closer to home: 
the “deportation” of FSM migrants 
from Guam’s jails back to the FSM. 
In early July 2016, during a radio 
address discussing the relationships 
between Guam, the FSM, and other 
countries that have Compacts of Free 
Association with the United States, 
Guam Governor Eddie Calvo called 
for an end to compact migrants taking 
advantage of the US federal govern-
ment’s lax enforcement of deportation 
provisions of the compact with regard 
to those compact migrants who do not 
abide by local and federal laws. Stress-
ing the disproportionate number of 
compact migrants in Guam’s prisons, 
Governor Calvo promised to formally 
contact the FSM government to try to 
130 the contemporary pacific • 30:1 (2018)
work out an arrangement for return-
ing migrants from the FSM in Guam’s 
jails back to the FSM (pdn, 11 July 
2016).
On 10 July 2016, shortly after 
the radio address, Governor Calvo 
escalated his efforts by “deporting,” 
for the first time, an inmate from the 
FSM back to the FSM. In what was 
labeled a “test case,” Calvo invoked 
his “residual authority” under the 
Organic Act and signed an execu-
tive order that authorized the Guam 
government to pay for a one-way 
ticket for the inmate to his home state 
of Chuuk in exchange for commut-
ing the inmate’s sentence as well as 
for an agreement by the inmate to 
never return to Guam. A spokesper-
son for the governor claimed that the 
Calvo administration had tried to get 
officials and entities in the US govern-
ment to address the issue of possible 
deportations of convicts back to the 
FSM, but to no avail. In light of that 
inaction, and because the convict met 
all the criteria for deportability—he 
had no local source of support, he was 
not attending a school, he had mul-
tiple felony convictions, and he was a 
public charge—Governor Calvo acted 
in lieu of federal authorities to deport 
the inmate (gdp, 14 July 2016).
Governor Calvo’s action received 
support from a local legislator, Senator 
Rory Respicio of the Guam Legis-
lature, who introduced a resolution 
on 15 July 2016 stating that the US 
government “consistently neglected to 
adequately enforce the provisions of 
the [compact] . . . and has not taken 
the necessary steps for the removal 
and deportation of those foreign 
criminals who are engaging in crimi-
nal activity” in Guam. The resolution 
supported Governor Calvo’s use of his 
Organic Act authority to act in lieu of 
federal authorities to deport convicted 
felons (gdp, 18 July 2016). Notably, 
however, Guam Attorney General 
Elizabeth Barrett-Anderson had noti-
fied the Guam Legislature on 8 July 
2016 that the jurisdiction for deporta-
tion lies with the US federal govern-
ment rather than at the state and local 
levels, and that deporting convicted 
migrants from Guam was not a prior-
ity for the federal government (pdn, 
19 July 2016).
Perhaps because of that clarifica-
tion from the attorney general, the 
Guam Legislature did not adopt 
Senator Respicio’s resolution, but 
that did not deter Governor Calvo 
from forging ahead with his new 
approach and repatriating more FSM 
convicts from Guam (pdn, 22 July 
2016). Tellingly, however, the Calvo 
administration stopped calling the 
actions “deportations.” Instead, when 
the administration orchestrated the 
repatriation of another inmate (again 
from Chuuk), the governor’s deputy 
press secretary stressed that the gov-
ernor did not deport inmates, as that 
was the purview of the US govern-
ment—rather, the Calvo administra-
tion entered into agreements with 
inmates to grant commutations (which 
were well within the authority of the 
governor) in exchange for voluntary 
and permanent departures from Guam 
(gdp, 26 July 2016). Attorney General 
Barrett-Anderson, while agreeing that 
the governor had the legal authority 
to commute sentences and enter into 
repatriation agreements with inmates, 
emphasized that she “disagreed . . .
wholeheartedly” with the notion that 
the governor of Guam has the legal 
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authority to deport and warned Gov-
ernor Calvo to “proceed cautiously” 
and in a “racially neutral” manner 
with his commutations initiative (pdn, 
2 Aug 2016).
The Calvo administration’s actions 
triggered official responses from the 
FSM. On 19 August 2016, after a fifth 
convict returned to the FSM under 
Governor Calvo’s commutations 
initiative, Speaker Wesley W Simina of 
the FSM Congress wrote to President 
Christian to voice his concerns about 
the Calvo administration usurping 
the authority of the US government in 
conducting deportations “and any-
thing that has the appearance thereof” 
(pdn, 4 Sept 2016). In early September 
2016, Governor Calvo received a let-
ter from FSM Consul General Robert 
Ruecho stating that the Office of the 
FSM Consulate General in Guam 
would no longer assist the Calvo 
administration in verifying the FSM 
citizenship of convicts whose sentences 
were commuted by Governor Calvo 
and who were slated for repatriation 
to the FSM. Without that verification, 
the convicts could not be readmitted 
into the FSM. On 6 September 2016, 
Governor Calvo responded to Speaker 
Simina with a letter explaining his 
commutations initiative and asking the 
FSM government to work with Guam 
in protecting the people of Guam 
and to “take responsibility for those 
who have abused [Guam’s] hospital-
ity . . . and soiled the reputations of 
those law-abiding men and women of 
Micronesia living on Guam” (gdp, 7 
Sept 2016).
Governor Calvo’s communication 
with Speaker Simina was just a warm-
up, though. The governor followed up 
shortly thereafter with a letter to Presi-
dent Christian that contained striking 
language. Pointing to the challenges 
of Guam and the FSM in “shepherd-
ing societies scorned by subjugation 
by imperial masters,” Calvo implored 
President Christian to reconsider the 
refusal of the Office of the FSM Con-
sulate General to assist Calvo’s com-
mutations initiative and warned that 
if the office did not change its tack, 
the governor would declare Consul 
General Ruecho persona non grata in 
Guam (pdn, 8 Sept 2016).
With a major diplomatic crisis 
brewing, President Christian autho-
rized FSM Department of Foreign 
Affairs Secretary Lorin Robert to 
communicate to Governor Calvo the 
FSM government’s concerns about 
the commutations initiative, including 
whether the convicts from the FSM 
went through proper due process, in 
full understanding, before agreeing 
to return to the FSM in exchange for 
commutations of their sentences, as 
well as whether it was appropriate 
for the Office of the FSM Consulate 
General in Guam to provide the neces-
sary citizenship verification rather 
than the FSM Department of Justice. 
The Calvo administration responded 
with incredulity, noting that it was the 
FSM that was denying due process to 
its own citizens who wished to return 
to the FSM and that the Office of the 
FSM Consulate General had aided the 
commutations initiative on numerous 
occasions in the past (gdp, 12 Sept 
2016).
Eventually, cooler heads prevailed. 
Shortly after the diplomatic row with 
the FSM erupted, Governor Calvo 
proceeded to commute the sentences 
of four more convicts from the FSM, 
bringing the total to nine by 1 October 
132 the contemporary pacific • 30:1 (2018)
2016, but his administration turned 
over those four convicts to the custody 
of US federal authorities for deporta-
tion proceedings rather than enter into 
repatriation agreements with them. 
Governor Calvo expressed satisfaction 
that the US government was finally 
treating the deportation of convicted 
compact migrants as a priority in 
Guam (pdn, 1 Oct 2016). The Calvo 
administration maintained their new 
approach for about a dozen more 
commutations throughout the rest of 
the period in review, as the Christian 
administration continued to refuse to 
assist in the original commutations-
and-repatriation effort.
As the FSM tamped down regional 
crises, it took a number of strides to 
burnish its reputation on the inter-
national level as a champion for the 
protection of the natural environment. 
In October 2016, in Kigali, Rwanda, a 
delegation from the FSM led efforts by 
the Parties to the Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer to adopt the Kigali Amend-
ment, which aims to phase down the 
 manufacture and use of hydrofluoro-
carbons (hfcs). hfcs—initially 
adopted as replacements for ozone-
depleting substances in refrigeration 
and air-conditioning—are four thou-
sand times more effective at warming 
the planet than carbon dioxide and are 
growing in usage by up to 15 percent 
per year. Phasing down the manufac-
ture and use of hfcs will avoid up to 
0.5 degree Celsius of global warming, 
playing a major role in meeting the 
goal in the Paris Agreement on climate 
change of keeping the average global 
temperature increase to no more than 
1.5 degrees Celsius above preindus-
trial levels. The FSM, along with 
Mauritius, had been the first country 
to propose amending the Montreal 
Protocol in 2009 to tackle hfcs, and 
the adoption of the Kigali Amendment 
on 15 October was a major diplomatic 
achievement for the FSM (Christian 
2016). Indeed, when the Marshall 
Islands became the first country to 
ratify the Kigali Amendment domesti-
cally in February 2017, its minister for 
foreign affairs proclaimed that “the 
world owes a great debt to the Feder-
ated States of Micronesia in particular 
for their tireless leadership in securing 
this [Kigali] Amendment” (unfccc 
2017).
In addition to its work on the Kigali 
Amendment, the FSM took steps to 
address environmental concerns closer 
to home but with international link-
ages. In July 2016, the World Heritage 
Committee of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization inscribed the ruins of 
Nan Madol on its World Heritage List 
as well as its List of World Heritage 
in Danger. Nan Madol is a series of 
nearly one hundred towering edifices 
on the shores of the main island of 
Pohnpei, fashioned six hundred to 
nine hundred years ago out of basalt 
and coral boulders, that were the 
ceremonial center of a vast politi-
cal dynasty. The inscription of Nan 
Madol as a World Heritage in Danger 
was owed to, among other things, the 
destabilizing effects of siltation and 
sea level rise on the structures along 
Pohnpei’s shores (kp, 22 July 2016). In 
mid-April 2017, in line with its previ-
ous creation of a shark sanctuary in 
its entire exclusive economic zone, the 
FSM enacted a law that doubled the 
area of its waters that would be closed 
to commercial fishing as regulated by 
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the FSM national government, that 
is, up to twenty-four nautical miles 
from the shores of the FSM out to sea 
(compared to the original distance of 
twelve nautical miles) (kp, 18 April 
2017). Most of the commercial fishing 
in FSM waters is by foreign fishing 
fleets pursuant to lucrative annual 
licenses granted by the FSM national 
government, so the closure is a signifi-
cant financial sacrifice for the FSM in 
the interest of environmental conser-
vation. And, in late May 2017, the 
Government of Japan (represented by 
its embassy to the FSM) signed a grant 
contract worth over us$850,000 to 
finance the first phase of a project by a 
Japanese outfit to assess leakages of oil 
from Japan’s numerous World War II 
airplane and shipwrecks in the Chuuk 
Lagoon and take steps to implement 
emergency measures to address those 
leaks (Japan-FSM Embassy 2017). 
The effort had been a long-standing 
priority of the FSM, dating back to the 
Emanuel Mori administration (2007–
2015), but the United States and Japan 
had long resisted entreaties by the 
FSM to take responsibility for assess-
ing and addressing leaks from their 
wrecks in FSM waters—a resistance 
that was doubly troublesome because 
those countries retained the right 
under international law to grant access 
to their wrecks. Indeed, during the 
United Nations Ocean Conference in 
June 2017, President Christian called 
on the United States and Japan to do 
their part in preventing the looming 
environmental catastrophe in the fed-
eration’s waters (rnz 2017).
The actions of the FSM on the 
international stage were broad based 
and varied, interacting with numer-
ous foreign entities and processes in 
pursuit of diverse goals. However, the 
FSM’s primary foreign partner and 
foil remained the United States, whose 
Compact of Free Association with the 
FSM provided grist for several major 
political developments (in addition 
to the controversy over “deporta-
tions” of FSM migrant-convicts from 
Guam). In late 2016, the FSM hired 
the “powerhouse” law firm of Arnold 
& Porter in Washington, dc, for 
approximately us$420,000 per year to 
assist the FSM in, among other things, 
“looking ahead to possible compact 
negotiations when funding under the 
current compact is expected to expire 
in 2023” (kp, 11 Nov 2016). A few 
months later, in early February 2017, 
the law firm likely had to handle a 
potential major crisis as media in 
the United States published a draft 
executive order being considered by 
the administration of US President 
Donald Trump that would, among 
other things, direct federal authorities 
to take steps to deny admission into 
the United States by aliens deemed to 
be likely “public charges” as well as to 
remove those already-admitted aliens 
who have become “public charges” 
(Marianas Variety, 13 Feb 2017). In 
light of long-standing concerns raised 
by the Guam and Hawai‘i govern-
ments about the strains imposed by 
compact migrants on their public 
services budgets, the draft order repre-
sented a significant threat to compact 
migrants. (As of press time, the draft 
executive order has not been final-
ized.) With that threat looming, the 
FSM and the United States officially 
confirmed and accepted Akillino H 
Susaia as ambassador of the FSM to 
the United States in mid-March 2017, 
finally filling the crucial post after 
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it had been vacant for over a year 
(fsmis, 28 March 2017).
The appointment of Ambassador 
Susaia took place in the same month 
that the FSM held a national referen-
dum to decide whether the national 
constitution of the FSM should be 
amended to allow citizens of the FSM 
to also hold citizenships in other 
countries without relinquishing their 
citizenship in the FSM. Although the 
proposed amendment did not men-
tion US citizenships, it was widely 
understood among FSM voters that 
the amendment was primarily aimed 
at allowing FSM citizens—many of 
whom currently reside indefinitely in 
the United States pursuant to the com-
pact—to obtain US citizenship without 
giving up their FSM citizenship. That 
objective caused grave consterna-
tion for former FSM President John 
R Haglelgam, who submitted a letter 
to the editor of the Kaselehlie Press 
in February 2017 that warned about 
major logistical and legal hurdles to 
becoming a dual citizen of the FSM 
and the United States and tarred dual 
citizenship as a major threat to the 
“national sovereignty and the con-
tinual development of nationalism” 
of the federation (kp, 8 Feb 2017).
In order for the proposed amend-
ment to be adopted, at least 75 
percent of votes cast in at least three 
of the four states of the FSM had to be 
in favor of the proposal—a rather high 
threshold. Ultimately, only Kosrae 
approved the proposal by the neces-
sary percentage (85 percent); less than 
a three-fourths majority of votes cast 
in each of the other three states were 
in favor of the proposal (just over 
70 percent in Pohnpei, 61 percent in 
Chuuk, and 52 percent in Yap) (kp, 
15 March 2017). For the foreseeable 
future, FSM migrants in the United 
States will be regulated by the immi-
gration provisions of the compact, 
unless they choose to forgo their 
FSM citizenship in favor of obtaining 
 citizenship in the United States.
As the FSM confronted numerous 
challenges and crises in its foreign 
relations during the period under 
review, the federation enjoyed a 
smooth domestic transition of power 
in a congressional election year. In 
early March 2017, along with voting 
on the proposed constitutional amend-
ment on dual citizenship, the federa-
tion cast votes to elect representatives 
to the ten two-year seats in Congress. 
Voters returned all incumbents except 
for one in Chuuk and one in Pohn-
pei, the  latter being the vice speaker 
of the FSM Congress (kp, 15 March 
2017). When the Twentieth Congress 
of the FSM convened for the first 
time in mid-May 2017, the members 
retained Senator Simina as Speaker 
and selected Senator Esmond Moses 
from Pohnpei as the new vice speaker. 
Chairmanships of the main commit-
tees of the Congress largely remained 
the same (kp, 12 May 2017). With the 
FSM Congress newly reorganized, and 
with two years remaining in the tenure 
of President Christian at the head 
of the federation, the FSM looked 
forward to maintaining and advancing 
the spirit of unity that the president 
had exhorted the federation to achieve 
several months earlier in a speech 
he delivered during commemoration 
festivities for the thirtieth anniversary 
of FSM Independence Day (kp, 3 Nov 
2016). After weathering a seces-
sion attempt by  Faichuuk (Mulalap 
2016) and internecine battles between 
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the FSM Congress and the execu-
tive branch in recent years (Mulalap 
2017); and with the international 
stature of the FSM being burnished 
as it chaired the Forum, led various 
 international environmental initia-
tives, and recalibrated its longstand-
ing political and legal relationship 
with the United States, the federation 
seemed to be on the cusp of being 
acknowledged as a major contributor 
to the international community—if it 
can just maintain calm relations on 
the home front.
clement yow mulalap
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Guam’s local elections for senators 
in the island’s 15-seat legislature, I 
Liheslaturan Guåhan, represented a 
similar coup d’état of received opin-
ion, as 7 of the 15 veteran politicians 
were voted out by wide margins, 
making way for a new generation 
of leaders not drawn from the usual 
elite class of the island’s civil servants 
(kuam, 9 Nov 2016). Long-serving 
incumbents from both parties, includ-
ing the powerful Speaker of the Legis-
lature, Judith Won Pat, a daughter of 
the local political legend Antonio Won 
Pat, were unseated (Marianas Vari-
ety, 14 Nov 2016). Guam Democrats 
retained control of the legislature with 
a nine-to-six majority—one less than 
required for a “supermajority,” which 
would allow their party to overcome 
a veto by Republican Governor Eddie 
Baza Calvo (Pacific Islands Report, 
9 Nov 2016). 
One significant issue that played a 
role in the desire for change among 
Guam’s voters was that of the gov-
ernor’s pay-raise scandal. After the 
2014 election, in which Governor 
Calvo was elected to a second term, 
his office submitted a bill to the Guam 
Legislature in special session to pro-
vide raises of up to $40,000 each for 
elected leaders, political appointees, 
and classified personnel—including 
the governor himself. The raises were 
approved at the time, but a public 
outcry immediately arose, and the 
legislature and governor scrambled 
to defend or amend their actions. On 
22 May 2017, the controversial raises 
were at last repealed, with the Guam 
Legislature voting 10 to 5 to override 
the governor’s veto (pdn, 23 March 
2017). 
The inauguration of President 
Trump in January 2017 brought with 
it a wave of anxiety for the local gov-
ernment and community over the new 
president’s ideological threat to a net-
work of social programs that  benefit 
residents of Guam, such as food 
stamps, welfare, and  housing assis-
tance (pdn, 24 May 2017). Overall, 
the US federal government is estimated 
to provide $500 million to $600 mil-
lion in assistance to Guam each year 
(pdn, 4 July 2016).
With the release of budget propos-
als from the Trump administration 
and the Republican-controlled US 
Congress, the negative impact on 
Guam was confirmed for many local 
officials, some of whom spoke out 
about the dramatic effect they might 
have. As a US territory, Guam does 
not have full representation in the US 
Congress or government but nonethe-
less is subject to all federal laws and 
decisions. At the time of this writ-
ing, Trump’s budget is still a work in 
progress, but it paints a bleak picture 
for Guam in terms of federal contribu-
tions. Funding for the arts, education, 
food stamps, and insular affairs would 
all be dramatically reduced (gdp, 
25 May 2017).
Although exact figures are not 
known at the time of this writing, 
Guam and other territories are also 
threatened with losing at least $3 mil-
lion of funding in “Compact Impact” 
aid. This aid represents financial 
assistance that the US government is 
supposed to be obligated to pay to off-
set the costs and strain on the island’s 
resources caused by mass immigration 
from the neighboring Micronesian 
countries whose citizens are entitled 
to enter US territories visa-free under 
their Compact of Free Association 
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relationship with the United States 
(pdn, 23 June 2017). 
The only increase in federal spend-
ing for Guam would be connected 
to the controversial military buildup 
and infrastructure projects related to 
expanding US military facilities on 
the island. Trump’s budget proposal 
would provide more than $300 mil-
lion for wastewater improvements 
and the construction of two air force 
hangars (pdn, 24 May 2017).
While government leaders lamented 
the potential federal cuts to fund-
ing for social services, a new activist 
group was formed in 2016 to halt one 
of the key components of the US mili-
tary buildup on Guam: the building of 
a firing range on the historic Litekyan 
(Ritidian) site. The group, named 
Prutehi Litekyan (Save Ritidian), has 
held teach-ins and petition drives and 
it plans to work with environmen-
tal watchdog groups in the United 
States to pursue legal options (kuam, 
6 March 2017). The pristine beaches, 
cliffs, caves, and jungle at Litekyan are 
a US national wildlife reserve, the site 
of an ancient Chamorro village and 
cave paintings, the home of endan-
gered species, and a spectacular beach 
beloved by area residents as well as 
tourists (CounterPunch, 4 Sept 2015). 
The building of the firing range or 
US military installations on Litekyan 
would further restrict public access 
and threaten the survival of artifacts, 
animal species, and rare native plants 
in the area, including the hayun lågu 
(Serianthes nelsonii), an endangered 
species with only one adult tree 
known living on Guam (pdn, 14 Nov 
2016).
Local concerns over the poten-
tial impact of Trump’s leadership of 
the US government on Guam were 
exacerbated by another example of 
federal interference in local affairs. On 
8 March 2017, in the case of Arnold 
Davis v Guam Election Commission, 
US District Judge Frances Tydingco 
Gatewood ruled in favor of Davis, 
a white expatriate who had been 
resident in Guam for some time (gdp, 
9 March 2017). Davis had filed a 
lawsuit in 2011 through the “Center 
for Individual Rights” in the United 
States, an extreme-right-wing legal 
organization known for its opposi-
tion to affirmative action and the 
Voting Rights Act. The center has 
received significant funding from Betsy 
DeVos, Trump’s notoriously unquali-
fied secretary of education, as well 
as the Koch brothers, the right-wing 
billionaire kingmakers. Davis and his 
lawyers claimed that a Government 
of Guam law mandating a nonbinding 
self-determination plebiscite violated 
Davis’s constitutional rights as a US 
citizen by prohibiting him from regis-
tering and participating on the basis 
of race (pdn, 9 March 2017). They 
were requesting a summary judgment 
declaring “the qualifications for voter 
eligibility in the political status plebi-
scite to be in violation of the 14th and 
15th Amendments to the US Constitu-
tion, the Voting Rights Act and the 
Organic Act of Guam” (kuam, 5 Nov 
2915).
The law in question provides for a 
self-determination plebiscite in which 
those who qualify as “native inhabit-
ants” are eligible to participate and 
choose between three future statuses 
for Guam: integration with the United 
States, free association with the United 
States, or independence. Native inhab-
itants are defined not by race, but by 
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the time of the granting of US citizen-
ship and limited self-government on 
Guam, and, as the judge herself noted 
in her ruling, the designation does 
therefore include persons of various 
races or ethnicities besides indigenous 
Chamorro. The designation applies to 
all who received their US citizenship 
by virtue of the Organic Act for Guam 
in 1950, as well as their descendants 
(Office of the Attorney General of 
Guam 2017).
Despite these factors—a time-based 
(rather than race-based) definition for 
native inhabitants and the fact that 
the plebiscite itself was nonbinding, 
enacted no law, elected no official, 
and was simply meant to provide a 
statement from the affected persons 
through which the Government of 
Guam might negotiate with the US 
government—Judge Gatewood ruled 
in favor of Davis (pdn, 8 March 
2017). Gatewood stated that the law 
was unconstitutional on the grounds 
of racial discrimination because the 
vast majority of native inhabitants 
were Chamorro. She found the intent 
and the effect of the law to be racially 
discriminatory. 
Also in March, the US Department 
of Justice, in connection to a com-
plaint also filed by Davis, threatened 
the Government of Guam with a 
lawsuit over the Chamorro Land Trust 
(gdp, 9 March 2017). First created 
in the 1970s, this trust provides land 
leases to landless indigenous Cha-
morro people in hopes of righting a 
historical injustice whereby thousands 
of people had their lands extralegally 
seized by the US military following 
World War II (gdp, 9 March 2017). 
This threat from the US Department 
of Justice, along with Judge Gate-
wood’s ruling, had a chilling effect on 
efforts underway to educate the Guam 
community as to their political status 
options. There was a great deal of 
confusion, especially among indig-
enous Chamorros, as it appeared that 
the US government was denying their 
existence and their rights, including 
their right to restorative justice. 
Guam’s political leaders were quick 
to respond to the threat posed by 
the Davis decision. Senator Therese 
 Terlaje authored a resolution in the 
Guam Legislature calling on the 
island’s attorney general to appeal the 
Davis decision, protect the Chamorro 
Land Trust, and defend the right of 
Guam’s native inhabitants to deter-
mine their destiny without overt or 
undue interference by the adminis-
tering power. The 17 March 2017 
public hearing on this bill lasted six 
hours and was attended by more than 
a hundred community members, all 
expressing frustration over the Davis 
decision and supporting an appeal. 
The resolution passed soon after (gdp, 
18 March 2017). 
This hearing was followed by 
weeks of protests, demonstrations, 
and forums, culminating in a large 
rally held on 7 April 2017 that was 
attended by more than eight hundred 
members of the community. The rally 
was organized by a grassroots col-
lective under the theme “Respect the 
CHamoru People” (see below regard-
ing the significance of this spelling). 
It was a multicultural event meant to 
provide a space where people of all 
ethnic backgrounds on Guam could 
come together to show their support 
for the Chamorro people and their 
continuing quest for decolonization 
(kuam, 7 April 2017). 
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On that same day, Guam Attorney 
General Elizabeth Barrett-Anderson, 
with the support of Governor Calvo, 
announced that she would appeal the 
Gatewood decision on the plebiscite 
and defend the Chamorro Land Trust 
against the US Department of Justice 
challenge (pdn, 7 April 2017).
Tension in the relationship between 
the Government of Guam and the US 
government is long-standing because 
Guam is treated as a possession rather 
than an equal partner or ally of the 
United States. Guam is not allowed 
the basic political right to determine 
its destiny or modify agreements such 
as the Compacts of Free Association 
that neighboring countries have with 
the United States and US military 
buildups that have profound impacts 
on its community (The Stream, 
12 April 2017).
One frequently problematic stick-
ing point in federal-territorial rela-
tions is immigration control. Despite 
its distance from the United States 
and its proximity to Asia, Guam is 
considered a US port of entry and its 
borders are controlled by US Customs 
and Immigration under the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security. Over 
the past  seventy years, this situation 
has resulted in the indigenous Cha-
morro people becoming a minority 
in their home island, where they 
now only comprise 37.1 percent of 
the population (cia World Factbook 
2017). More recently, the lack of local 
control over immigration has led to 
labor shortages, in particular in the 
construction industry (pdn, 11 Sept 
2016). US Homeland Security controls 
the flow of foreign workers to Guam 
and, in 2016, began to reject applica-
tions for h-2b visas (for temporary 
nonagricultural workers) at unprec-
edented rates. The rate of rejection 
was so high that more than a dozen 
businesses filed a lawsuit against 
Homeland Security, claiming unfair 
treatment and unfair policies. Gov-
ernor Calvo called the denial of visas 
“economic sabotage and warfare” 
against the people of Guam (pdn, 
6 April 2017). 
For this reason, in April 2017, 
Governor Calvo, who had long been 
a supporter of the US military buildup 
on Guam, publicly withdrew his sup-
port. He argued that it was unten-
able for the island’s economy to have 
foreign workers provided for military 
buildup–related projects while applica-
tions for civilian projects to hire the 
same type of workers were rejected. 
Although it is unclear what his verbal-
ized withdrawal of support would 
translate to in terms of policy or nego-
tiation, it nonetheless underscored the 
difficulties of Guam’s territorial posi-
tion in terms of basic planning and 
governance (pdn, 6 April 2017). 
While US Homeland Security was 
unwilling to work with Governor 
Calvo on immigration, there was 
another issue where they did find 
common ground—his deportation of 
certain criminals from the Philippines 
and the Federated States of Micronesia 
(FSM; see also FSM political review, 
this issue). The governor stated that 
the Compact of Free Association 
between the US and FSM includes 
 criteria that allow him to send regional 
migrants back to their respective 
nations (pdn, 2 Aug 2016). Attorney 
General Barrett-Anderson cautioned 
the governor against such actions, 
saying they could be challenged on 
grounds of racial bias (pdn, 2 Aug 
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2016). The governor claimed that the 
Guam Organic Act of 1950 gave him 
power to deport criminals; the attor-
ney general disagreed but stated that 
it did give him the ability to pardon 
and commute sentences on condition 
of leaving the country and not return-
ing (pdn, 2 Aug 2016). Guam law 
currently calls for the deportation of a 
compact immigrant who is convicted 
of a felony or crime of moral turpi-
tude, sentenced to one or more years 
for any crime, or is a repeat offender 
found guilty of driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol (gdp, 23 Oct 2016). 
The situation exposes the politi-
cal differences between the FSM and 
Guam, with the former being an 
autonomous state and the latter being 
a US territory. The issue is typically 
framed by Calvo’s opponents as a dip-
lomatic one between the FSM and the 
United States, with Guam having little 
to no formal authority or control over 
its own borders. However, it also dem-
onstrates the enduring social, cultural, 
and economic ties between the two 
Micronesian countries on their own 
terms: while lower-level politicians 
from the FSM repeatedly clashed with 
Governor Calvo over his views on 
the deportation of their citizens, FSM 
President Peter Christian has refrained 
from making any public statement on 
the matter. 
Wesley Simina, Speaker of the 
Nineteenth Congress in the FSM, 
wrote to President Christian to protest 
that the matter should be one for the 
US government to resolve without the 
intervention of “Hagåtña,” the capital 
of Guam (pdn, 4 Sept 2016). Chuuk 
Senate President Mark Mailo also 
urged the FSM president to approach 
the United States directly on the 
matter, but President Christian was 
unavailable for comment to the news 
media (pdn, 4 Sept 2016). Mr Chris-
tian made a brief reference to the issue 
at a recent regional forum but declined 
to be interviewed on the subject when 
approached by Guam news media 
(gdp, 5 May 2017). 
In September 2016, Robert Ruecho, 
the FSM consul general to Guam, 
announced that by executive order his 
office would no longer comply with 
the Calvo administration by provid-
ing information on FSM nationals. 
In response, Calvo declared Ruecho 
“persona non grata” and threatened 
to extend this designation to any 
other foreign officials who challenged 
his authority or refused to cooperate 
with his government in determining 
whether a convicted criminal was an 
FSM national (gdp, 23 Oct 2016). 
Palau President Tommy Remenge-
sau Jr, on the other hand, reached out 
to Calvo to seek assistance in arrang-
ing for a Palauan prisoner to serve his 
remaining time on his home island 
(gdp, 23 Oct 2016). Governor Calvo’s 
office also received letters from FSM 
convicts requesting commutation of 
their sentences on condition of leaving 
Guam (gdp, 29 Oct 2016).
In April 2017, the number of 
non-US citizens assigned to removal 
or deportation reached twenty-eight 
when two FSM citizens, a child sex 
offender and a convicted vehicle thief, 
were transferred to US custody (gdp, 
24 April 2017). Calvo has continued 
to request US Homeland Security 
assistance with the deportation of 
criminal immigrants from Guam 
 (Kaselehlie Press, 16 Sept 2016).
A two-year saga in court over the 
death of Bert Piolo, a Guam police 
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officer, ended in 2017. Fellow offi-
cer Mark Torre Jr was present at the 
time of his death and appeared to be 
implicated by Piolo himself during a 
911 call in which Piolo stated, “He 
shot me.” The jury found Torre not 
guilty of murder and manslaughter but 
guilty of negligent homicide and other 
charges. In June, Torre was sentenced 
to eight years in prison (pdn, 21 June 
2017).
The past year also saw the fall of 
one of the most enduring public icons 
of Guam life, Anthony Apuron, who 
had served as archbishop of Guam 
since 1986. Archbishop Apuron was 
confronted by several scandals and 
controversies in recent years, start-
ing with his support for a foreign sect 
known as the Neocatechumenal Way, 
which put him at odds with main-
stream Guam Catholics (Crux, 21 
March 2017). Apuron clashed with 
many over his demotion of several 
priests who were critical of this sect. 
He also faced allegations of financial 
misconduct that appeared to benefit 
the Neocatechumenal Way  (Bevacqua 
2017, 109). His flock’s misgivings 
gave rise to a community group 
known as the Concerned Catholics 
of Guam, which sought to unite 
 Catholics against Apuron (kuam, 
22 Aug 2016). 
In 2016, the scandal grew to new 
heights as a number of men came 
forward to accuse Apuron and other 
priests of sexually molesting them 
while they were young boys. In 
May 2016, Apuron was temporarily 
replaced and withdrew from public 
life. In November of that year, he was 
formally succeeded by Archbishop 
Michael Byrnes. At present, Apuron is 
facing a canonical trial in the Vatican 
(pdn, 31 Dec 2016). The Concerned 
Catholics of Guam, who had protested 
in front of the cathedral in Guam’s 
capital for fifty-four straight weeks 
demanding Apuron’s removal, ended 
their protests in July 2017. They had 
achieved their goal of ousting Apuron 
from his seat of power in Guam, while 
still awaiting the Vatican’s final judg-
ment (pdn, 9 July 2017). 
The University of Guam was 
shaken by sex scandals in 2016 and 
2017 as well, as Michael Blair Ehlert, 
a longtime tenured professor, faced a 
second-degree felony charge of sexual 
assault against a student, as well 
as multiple other charges based on 
testimonies from his former students 
accusing him of rape and other forms 
of sexual misconduct. He was con-
victed on one count of third-degree 
criminal sexual conduct and another 
count of attempted third-degree 
criminal sexual assault against two 
of his university students (pdn, 31 
July 2017). Ehlert had been placed on 
administrative leave pending the out-
come of the trial (pdn, 28 July 2017), 
and the university announced that 
it would terminate his employment 
following his felony conviction (pdn, 
3 Aug 2017). In response to public-
ity surrounding the Ehlert case, the 
University of Guam updated its sexual 
misconduct policy in 2016 to ban all 
“amorous relations” between profes-
sors and undergraduate students (gdp, 
18 Feb 2016).
Tourist arrivals represented a 
bright spot in Guam’s economic news. 
After setting a record for most tour-
ist arrivals during a year in 2015, the 
island surpassed that record in 2016. 
The Guam Visitors Bureau recorded 
1,535,410 visitors in 2016, a 9 percent 
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increase from 2015. Although Guam 
saw a slight decrease in visitors from 
Japan—normally its primary tourist 
market—significant growth occurred 
in Guam’s second-largest market, 
South Korea, which, for the first time, 
grew to more than half a million 
travelers (kuam, 30 Dec 2016). This 
growth continued into the first and 
second quarters of 2017, as tourist 
arrivals through June also set several 
monthly arrival records (pdn, 12 July 
2017). 
Chamorro culture enjoyed the 
spotlight in 2016, in particular when 
Guam hosted the Twelfth Festival of 
Pacific Arts. This trend has contin-
ued, first with the partial opening of 
the long-awaited Guam Museum and 
second with the reestablishment of 
the Chamorro Language Commission. 
The Guam Museum was originally 
slated to open years previously, but 
construction and administrative delays 
plagued the project. In November 
2016, the Guam Museum officially 
opened its doors to the public; how-
ever, the permanent exhibit for the 
museum remains unfinished and only 
temporary exhibits are currently on 
display (see Bennett 2017). 
The Chamorro Language Commis-
sion, first established in 1964, lapsed 
nearly twenty years ago following 
controversial debates over Chamorro 
orthography. Particularly controversial 
was the spelling of the word “Cha-
morro” itself, with the alternative of 
“CHamoru” preferred by some. The 
commission met again officially in 
May 2017, chaired by longtime activ-
ist and former Senator Hope Alvarez 
Cristobal (gdp, 9 May 2017).
Chamorro sports history was made 
in 2017 when Zach Banner became 
the first Chamorro to be drafted into 
the National Football League by 
the Indiana Colts. While receiving 
national attention, Banner consistently 
expressed pride in his Chamorro roots 
and proudly displayed the Guam 
flag when he was drafted and in his 
publicity images (Guam Sports Net-
work, 27 April 2017). In July 2017, 
he returned to Guam and provided 
training camps for local youth (pdn, 
29 June 2017). Avid fans regularly 
mobbed Banner to take selfies (pho-
tos of themselves) with this newest 
 Chamorro star on the world stage. 
The 2015 corruption scandal 
involving fifa (Féderation Internatio-
nale du Football Association)—where 
US prosecutors indicted and convicted 
more than forty executives—also 
affected Guam’s local sports in April 
2017. Guam businessman George Lai 
had been the president of the Guam 
Football Association since 2001. He 
was accused of accepting close to a 
million dollars in bribes from individu-
als who wanted his help in influencing 
the leadership of the Asian Football 
Confederation and fifa itself. Lai has 
pled guilty to wire fraud and banking 
crime and resigned his post; he is cur-
rently cooperating with US authorities 
in exchange for leniency (pdn, 27 July 
2017).
The past year saw the funerals of 
several prominent members of the 
Guam community. Magdalena S N 
Bayani, known as “Tan Deda,” had 
received the designation of Master of 
Chamorro Culture for her life’s work 
as a techa or Catholic prayer leader. 
She passed away on 30 December 
2016 at the age of 101. Frank Blas 
Sr, a longtime politician and former 
lieutenant governor of Guam, passed 
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away on 1 August 2016 at the age 
of 75. Alfred Curie Ysrael, a million-
aire real estate developer, business-
man, owner of several tourist hotels 
on island, and brother-in-law of the 
 Honorable Madeleine Z Bordallo, 
received a state funeral on Guam 
when he passed away on 10 March 
2017 at the age of 86. 
Looking to the future, Guam 
 continues in an atmosphere of  
political anxiety, especially as inter-
national relations across the Asia-
Pacific region may shift under the 
Trump administration. In 2016, 
China  developed new missiles dubbed 
“Guam Killers,” capable of striking 
Guam (Washington Post, 11 May 
2016). Throughout 2017, North 
Korea conducted well-publicized 
missile tests, which, while unlikely 
to cause much  damage directly to 
the continental United States, are 
capable of wrecking much havoc on 
the Korean peninsula and surrounding 
areas (gdp, 9 June 2017).
michael lujan bevacqua and  
elizabeth ua ceallaigh bowman
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Marshall Islands
For the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands (RMI), the period under 
review saw the passing of several 
 distinguished community mem-
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bers. Most notable were the deaths 
of two customary leaders from the 
Rālik (western) islands. Iroojḷapḷap 
(Paramount Chief) Anjua Loeak 
died in early September 2016 and 
was laid to rest at Aelōñḷapḷap Atoll 
later that month. Loeak was the 
senior landowner for the domains of 
Iroojḷapḷap Litokwa and Iroojḷapḷap 
Loeak, which include approximately 
one-third of Kuwajleen (Kwajalein) 
Atoll and twelve wāto (land parcels) 
on  Kuwajleen Island (pir, 1 June 
2000).  Kuwajleen Atoll is the site of 
the  Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile 
Defense Test Site, where the US Army 
develops, tests, and tracks intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles and missile 
interceptors. In 2001, former Presi-
dent Kessai Note named Loeak to the 
Compact Advisory Committee to help 
guide the Compact Negotiation Com-
mission in talks with the United States 
on the renewed Compact of Free 
Association, which went into effect 
in 2003. Loeak was also a member 
of the Kwajalein Negotiating Com-
mittee, which represented Kuwajleen 
landowner interests in the negotia-
tions (pir, 31 Dec 2001). Following 
an eight-year standoff with the United 
States, Loeak joined Iroojḷapḷap Imata 
Kabua and Iroojḷapḷap and then 
President Jurelang Zedkaia in sign-
ing an agreement that extended US 
use of the Kuwajleen test site through 
2066 (pir, 12 May 2011). In Janu-
ary 2017, the Rālik islands also lost 
customary leader Lerooj (Chieftess) 
Seagull Kabua James, younger sister 
of Iroojḷapḷap Imata Kabua. Lerooj 
Seagull resided on Ebjā (Ebeye) Island 
and in Honolulu and was known 
for upholding Marshallese culture 
and traditions. She was also a strong 
proponent of education and a sup-
porter of the national women’s group 
Women United Together Marshall 
Islands (mij, 27 Jan 2017).
The Marshall Islands lost another 
leader and teacher in January 2017 
with the passing of Captain Korent 
Joel, one the country’s last surviving 
ri-meto (traditional navigators). Cap-
tain Korent had been instrumental in 
the recent movement to revive tradi-
tional Marshallese meto (navigation). 
He worked with the nonprofit organi-
zation Waan Aelōñ in Ṃajeḷ (Canoes 
of the Marshall Islands) and Dr Joseph 
Genz of the University of Hawai‘i at 
Hilo to document, preserve, and pass 
on traditional navigational knowl-
edge. In his youth on Roñḷap Atoll, 
Captain Korent learned a system of 
wave piloting in which navigators 
detect how islands disrupt the flow of 
ocean swells and currents. In 2006, he 
used the system to earn the status of 
ri-meto by sailing between Kuwajleen 
and Ujae atolls. In 2010, Captain 
Korent helped guide a canoe led by 
Waan Aelōñ in Ṃajeḷ Director Alson 
Kelen on a successful voyage between 
Mājro and Aur atolls using only the 
wave patterns to guide them, and in 
2015 he prepared Kelen on land for a 
successful repeat voyage from Mājro 
to Aur (mij, 12 Jan 2017). 
Several prominent political and 
community leaders also passed away 
during this period. Among them was 
former Senator Rellong Lemari, who 
represented Lae Atoll in the Nitijeḷā 
(Parliament) for nineteen years until 
his retirement in 2011 (mij, 3 March 
2017). Former Mile Atoll Senator 
Tadashi Lometo, who was elected the 
first mayor of Mile in 1982 and served 
in the Nitijeḷā from 1996 to 2008 (mij, 
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26 Aug 2016), also died during this 
period. Lometo served as a member of 
the Public Accounts Committee, which 
investigated the sale of RMI passports 
to citizens of the People’s Republic of 
China and other nations in the 1980s 
and 1990s (pir, 12 Jan 1998), and 
as minister of health and minister-in-
assistance to former President Kessai 
Note in the early 2000s. Other deaths 
include Clyde Heine, a cofounder 
and longtime general manager of the 
Majuro (Mājro) Stevedore & Terminal 
Company and brother of President 
Hilda Heine; Morean Ellen Kabua, 
wife of Council of Irooj (Council of 
Chiefs) member Jimata Kabua; Salome 
Lanwi, who served as chief nurse at 
the Mājro hospital for several decades; 
and Deaconess Krojel Jabnil Wase.
The period under review has been 
productive for the RMI government. 
In what has been called “one of the 
most significant legislative sessions 
for the Nitijeḷā since it was estab-
lished in 1979,” the governing body 
enacted several important, and in 
some cases controversial, laws that 
will have lasting impacts on commu-
nities in the Marshall Islands and in 
the diaspora (mij, 7 Oct 2016). The 
legislation was largely in response 
to the plan  introduced by President 
Heine in August 2016 and subse-
quently adopted by the cabinet as 
“Agenda 2020: A Framework for 
Progress” (RMI Office of the President 
2016). The plan identifies ten national 
challenges and ten priority govern-
ment reforms to be adopted over the 
next three years. Challenges include 
economic growth and employment, 
education, climate change and disas-
ter risk mitigation, water and food 
security, quality of life on Ebjā and 
the outer islands, and health services. 
Priority reform areas include fiscal 
management, social security, infra-
structure planning and development, 
management of cultural and historical 
resources, nuclear accountability and 
justice, and amending the RMI Consti-
tution. Between August and December 
2016, the Nitijeḷā passed nineteen 
pieces of legislation that address 
these issues, and President Heine has 
introduced several initiatives since 
January 2017 to help push her agenda 
forward. The Constitutional Conven-
tion also got underway in April 2017 
and remains in session at the time of 
this writing.
In terms of legislative action, the 
Nitijeḷā enacted several laws focused 
on environmental and community 
health and wellness. The Styrofoam 
and Plastic Products Prohibition Act 
2016 bans disposable Styrofoam, 
 plastic bags, and plastic cups and 
plates, and establishes a ten-cent bev-
erage container fee, an environmental 
fund, and a recycling program (RMI 
Nitijeḷā 2016g). The Import Duties 
(Funding Supplement Amendment) 
Act 2016 addresses skyrocketing rates 
of type 2 diabetes and other health 
concerns by increasing import taxes 
on alcohol and tobacco products and 
instituting a new import tax on sweet-
ened and sugar-added beverages (RMI 
Nitijeḷā 2016d). The Minimum Wage 
(Amendment) Act 2016 raises the min-
imum wage to us$2.50 per hour and 
an additional fifty cents per hour per 
year until it reaches $4.00 per hour 
(RMI Nitijeḷā 2016e). The minimum 
wage in Marshall Islands had been 
stagnant at $2.00 per hour since 1999 
(mij, 19 Aug 2016). These three laws 
and amendments have the potential to 
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improve the quality of life of Marshall 
Islanders across the country.
In addition to legislation focused on 
enhancing the physical and environ-
mental health of Marshallese com-
munities, several laws were enacted to 
protect children and families. Among 
these was the Adoptions (Amendment) 
Act 2016, which strengthens over-
sight of international adoptions and 
protects “the best interests of children 
and prevent[s] the abduction, sale, and 
trafficking of children” (RMI Nitijeḷā 
2016a, 11). The amendment was a 
response to renewed concerns about 
unethical adoption practices involving 
Marshallese children in the Marshall 
Islands, in Hawai‘i, and on the US 
continent. The concern also prompted 
amendment sponsor and Minister of 
Internal Affairs Amenta Matthew to 
request help from the Hawai‘i Family 
Court to ensure that any adoptions 
of Marshallese children in Hawai‘i 
comply with RMI law. Over the past 
several years, Hawai‘i hospitals have 
seen an increasing number of women 
from the Marshall Islands seeking to 
surrender their babies for adoption 
immediately after giving birth. Accord-
ing to hospital staff, some women 
appear to have been coached with 
answers to questions that will help 
circumvent RMI and State of Hawai‘i 
adoption regulations (Perez 2017). A 
similar trend occurred in Hawai‘i in 
the 1990s and early 2000s but was 
largely curtailed through restrictions 
imposed by the RMI Adoptions Act 
of 2002. The new amendment aims 
to toughen those restrictions. Another 
law passed during this period will 
protect Marshallese girls and young 
women by raising the minimum legal 
age for marriage of girls from sixteen 
to eighteen years. The amendment 
to the Births, Deaths and Marriage 
Registration Act brings the Marshall 
Islands into compliance with the 
United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (crc), which the 
RMI ratified in 1993. It also bridges 
the “disparity between the minimum 
legal age for the marriage of boys and 
that of girls as recommended by the 
crc” (RMI Nitijeḷā 2016b, 8). 
The Nitijeḷā passed two acts during 
this period that have been the subject 
of intense discussion across the Mar-
shallese community. The Social Secu-
rity (Amendment) Act 2016 prompted 
months of confusion, debate, and 
pushback by employers, commu-
nity leaders, and the general public. 
The amendment aimed to reform 
the Marshall Islands Social Security 
Administration (missa) and stabilize 
the RMI retirement fund by “remov-
ing loopholes, increasing contributions 
and decreasing benefits” (RMI Nitijeḷā 
2016f, 11). The original amendment 
included an increase in the required 
employer/employee tax contribu-
tion from 7 percent to 8 percent, the 
elimination of the $5,000 per month 
cap on taxable income, a 5 percent 
reduction in monthly payments for 
beneficiaries receiving between $200 
and $1,000 per month, a $1,000 
maximum monthly benefit limit, and 
a prohibition on the payment of social 
security benefits to any person who is 
still employed. The reform was needed 
to address missa’s $7 million annual 
shortfall and the likelihood that the 
fund will go bankrupt by 2023 (pir, 
2 May 2016). On its passage, the 
amendment prompted an outpour-
ing of dissent from business owners, 
community leaders, and retirees, 
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who broadly opposed changes to the 
retirement system that they consid-
ered harmful to retirees, low-income 
individuals, and small business owners 
(mij, 30 Sept 2016). President Heine 
responded by announcing in her state 
of the nation address in January 2017 
that implementation of the amended 
law would be delayed and that the 
cabinet would propose modifications 
(Heine 2017). The revised amend-
ment addresses many of the concerns 
expressed by increasing caps on 
monthly benefits and quarterly  taxable 
income; shifting to a graduated cut 
in benefits based on the amount of 
monthly benefits received, with no 
one who receives less than $400 per 
month being subjected to a cut; and 
authorizing tax exemptions on various 
forms of income, including per diems, 
housing allowances, and others. To 
offset some of the financial impacts 
of these changes, the revised amend-
ment includes a graduated increase 
in the retirement age from sixty to 
sixty-five by 2025 and eliminates 
early and deferred retirement (mij, 
10 March 2017). The new version of 
the amended law went into effect in 
March 2017 (RMI Nitijeḷā 2016f).
In late September 2016, the Nitijeḷā 
passed another controversial law 
“eliminating the postal voting system 
for persons residing outside of the 
Republic” (RMI Nitijeḷā 2016c, 5). In 
elections since that time, only eligible 
voters who currently live in the Mar-
shall Islands can vote. Postal absentee 
ballots will be made available only to 
eligible voters who are temporarily 
out of the country on Election Day 
or who are unable to vote in person 
due to illness or disability. The aims 
of the amendment are to allow only 
those citizens who pay taxes and are 
residents of the country to choose 
their national and local representa-
tives and to improve the efficiency, 
cost, and accuracy of the voting 
process. Following its approval by a 
slim vote in the Nitijeḷā (13 to 12), 
the amendment sparked dissent on the 
part of off-island Marshall Islanders 
and others who used social media to 
voice their disapproval. Opposition 
was so intense that it prompted the 
Council of Irooj to submit a letter of 
concern to the Nitijeḷā. In October 
2016,  council members met with 
Speaker of the Nitijeḷā Kenneth Kedi 
and other government representatives 
to request that the Nitijeḷā draft a 
new amendment allowing off-island 
Marshall Islanders to continue to vote 
in elections. Despite this rare move 
by the Council of Irooj to become 
directly involved in political matters—
although the RMI Constitution grants 
the twelve-member body the authority 
to do so—Speaker Kedi stated that the 
council’s expression of concern had 
not followed “the Constitutionally 
prescribed format” and signed the bill 
into law (mij, 28 Oct 2016). Moving 
forward, Marshall Islanders living 
outside the country will no longer cast 
absentee ballots by mail as they have 
done since the adoption of the Elec-
tion and Referenda Act of 1980. With 
an estimated 30 percent of Marshall 
Islanders living abroad, the change 
will likely have a dramatic impact on 
the outcomes of future elections. 
In addition to legislative actions 
taken during the 2016 session of the 
Nitijeḷā, the republic’s fourth Consti-
tutional Convention (Con-Con) was 
convened in April 2017 to consider 
more than twenty proposed amend-
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ments to the RMI Constitution. Fol-
lowing article XII, section 4—which 
outlines the rules for amending the 
constitution by constitutional conven-
tion and referendum—the path to the 
Con-Con began in September 2015 
with the Nitijeḷā’s adoption of the 
Constitutional Convention Act 2015 
(RMI Nitijeḷā 2015), thereby setting 
forth the proposals to be considered 
as amendments. In August 2016, the 
RMI Electoral Administration issued 
a timetable for activities leading up 
to the convention special election on 
21 February 2017. These included 
a month of voter education events, 
nominations for convention repre-
sentatives, the official announcement 
of candidates, preparation of ballots, 
and elections personnel training. By 
December 2016, 143 candidates had 
registered to run for forty-five conven-
tion seats. Among the candidates were 
twenty-four irooj, including several 
senators, contending for twelve irooj 
seats, and a host of senators and 
members of the general population 
vying for island delegate seats. Sena-
tors Michael Kabua of Kuwajleen, 
Christopher Loeak of Aelōñḷapḷap, 
Wilbur Heine of Mile, and Bruce 
Bilimon of Ṃaḷoeḷap ran for irooj 
seats, leaving their island delegate 
seats open to other candidates (mij, 
23 Dec 2016). Senator Kessai Note of 
Jebat, First Gentleman Tommy Kijiner 
Jr of Likiep, and Senator David Kabua 
of Wōtto ran unopposed for delegate 
seats (mij, 3 Feb 2017). Following the 
Election and Referenda (Amendment)
(1) Act of 2016, Marshall Islanders 
living overseas were not eligible to 
cast absentee postal ballots. Despite 
a range of publicity and educational 
efforts, voter turnout was as low as 20 
percent on Mājro and other atolls (mij, 
3 March 2017). Following months 
of preparation, the Constitutional 
Convention got underway on 13 April 
2017 with an opening ceremony at 
the International Convention Center 
on Mājro. The first order of busi-
ness was the election of convention 
officers. Senator and former President 
Kessai Note of Jebat was elected 
president, beating out Senator and 
former President Christopher Loeak 
of Aelōñḷapḷap by just one vote (22 
to 21). Senator and former President 
Casten Nemra prevailed over former 
Senator Phillip Muller for the vice 
presidency (25 to 18), and Yolanda 
Lodge-Ned won the uncontested 
 secretarial seat with forty-one votes 
(mij, 21 April 2017). Delegates met 
on 17 April 2017 for the convention’s 
first business session, at which time 
discussion and debate on the consti-
tutional amendments put forth by the 
Nitijeḷā began.
Perhaps the highest-profile and 
most controversial of the constitu-
tional amendments up for consid-
eration is Proposal 4, which would 
amend RMI Constitution article V, 
section 3 to allow for the direct elec-
tion of the president by the people 
rather than by the Nitijeḷā. Under the 
RMI’s current system, the Nitijeḷā 
elects the president from among 
current senators (RMI Constitution 
1979). The proposed amendment aims 
to give more voice to the electorate by 
granting voters the right to elect their 
own president and to create politi-
cal stability in the republic, which 
has experienced numerous votes of 
no confidence by the Nitijeḷā against 
sitting presidents over the past several 
years. If approved, the amendment 
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would dramatically alter election 
procedures, the functioning of the 
Nitijeḷā, and, potentially, the outcomes 
of future elections. Proposal 5 seeks 
to further amend article V by creat-
ing a position of vice president, who 
would also be elected directly by the 
people. Both proposals include the 
provision that the president and vice 
president be natural-born citizens of 
the  Marshall Islands. 
Several other proposed amendments 
seek to remedy perceived inequities 
and issues of concern in the execution 
and outcomes of national-level elec-
tions. Proposal 9 would amend article 
IV, section 1 to reserve 6 of the 33 
current Nitijeḷā seats for women, with 
2 seats from Mājro Atoll and 1 each 
from Kuwajleen, Aelōñḷapḷap, and 
Jālwōj atolls to be contested exclu-
sively by women. The current Nitijeḷā 
has three woman senators—the most 
to sit on the Nitijeḷā at any one time 
since the nation’s first election in 
1979—including President Hilda 
Heine of Aur, Senator Daisy Alik-
Momotaro of Jālwōj, and Senator 
Amenta Matthew of Utrōk. Previ-
ous woman senators include Evelyn 
Konou of Jālwōj and Abacca Anjain­
Maddison of Roñḷap. The goal of the 
amendment is to increase the repre-
sentation of women in the Nitijeḷā. 
Proposal 19 would further reform the 
electoral process by altering eligibil-
ity requirements for Nitijeḷā candi-
dates. The amendment would revise 
article IV, section 4 to require that any 
Nitijeḷā candidate have land rights 
by birth and be a natural-born RMI 
citizen. The goal of the amendment 
is to require that Nitijeḷā candidates 
be Marshallese not just by citizenship 
but also by descent. The proposal is a 
response to the controversy that arose 
during the 2015 election cycle, when 
naturalized citizen Jack Niedenthal 
ran for a seat in the Nitijeḷā for Mājro 
Atoll. In late 2014, the RMI Electoral 
Administration barred Niedenthal 
from running on the grounds that he 
did not have a Marshallese parent or 
a traditional jowi (matriclan), and the 
attorney general upheld the decision. 
Niedenthal brought the matter to the 
RMI High Court, which ruled that 
the RMI Constitution authorizes any 
qualified voter over the age of twenty-
one to run for office (RMI High Court 
2015). Although the ruling cleared 
the path for Niedenthal to stand for 
election, he lost by a significant mar-
gin (mij, 27 Nov 2015). If approved, 
Proposal 19 would disqualify Nie-
denthal and others in similar circum-
stances from standing for election in 
the future.
Several proposed amendments 
seek to address issues related to RMI 
citizenship and land rights and tenure. 
Proposal 22 would amend article 
XI, section 2(b), which entitles any 
eligible foreign national who has been 
a resident of the RMI for at least three 
years and is the parent of a child who 
is an RMI citizen to apply for RMI 
citizenship. The change would make it 
more difficult for foreign nationals to 
obtain RMI citizenship by increasing 
the residency requirement from three 
to ten years. Proposal 1 would further 
amend the same article and section 
by requiring that any person applying 
for citizenship based on parentage of 
a Marshallese child also be married 
to the Marshallese parent of the child 
who is the basis of the claim. Regard-
ing land rights and tenure, Proposal 8 
would amend article X to restrict the 
political reviews • micronesia 151
sale and ownership of land to RMI 
citizens and the RMI government. 
Currently, article X, section 1[2] of 
the constitution stipulates only that 
a person cannot lawfully alienate 
any piece of land by sale, mortgage, 
lease, license or otherwise without the 
approval of the iroojḷapḷap (para-
mount chief), irooj-iddik (child of a 
chief) where applicable, aḷap (lineage 
head), and the senior ri-jerbal (senior 
worker/commoner) of the land in 
question, “who shall be deemed to 
represent all persons having an inter-
est in that land” (RMI Constitution 
1979). The proposed amendment 
would eliminate the possibility of 
making such a transfer to a for-
eign national, nation, corporation, 
or other entity. Proposal 20 would 
further amend article X to include a 
new  section providing for traditional 
dispute resolution in land tenure cases. 
As the RMI Constitution includes no 
such provision, people have relied on 
the RMI courts to address and resolve 
land disputes, leading to a spiraling 
occurrence of litigation. If approved, 
the amendment would shift the 
supervision of land disputes from the 
court system to a customary body and 
process. 
Proposal 21 would amend article 
IV, section 2(1) of the constitution to 
include Ānen­kio Atoll (Wake Island) 
as part of the RMI electoral district 
that currently includes Jemọ Island 
and Ṇadikdik, Ādkup, Tōkā, Pikaar, 
Bokaak, Roñdik, and Aelōñin Ae 
atolls, which are all presently unin-
habited. Article IV, section 2(1) of the 
RMI Constitution states that each of 
these atolls and islands is “included in 
the electoral district with which it is 
most closely associated, pursuant to 
the customary law or any traditional 
practice” (RMI Constitution 1979). 
While the proposal appears on its face 
to be about elections, it in fact repre-
sents an assertion of RMI jurisdiction 
over Ānen­kio Atoll. The United States 
has claimed Ānen­kio since 1898—
the same year it occupied Hawai‘i 
and took possession of Guam and 
the Philippines following the Span-
ish American War—and has operated 
several US military installations on the 
atoll since 1941. The Marshall Islands 
maintains that Ānen­kio lies within 
its borders, and Marshallese tradition 
identifies the atoll as an ancient ḷārooj 
(mij, 26 Aug 2016)—a mostly unin-
habited island or atoll reserved for 
food gathering, usually for a chief and 
his immediate family. In April 2016, 
the RMI government submitted “450 
pages of geographical coordinates, 
treaty agreements and 25 charts that 
together officially declare the baselines 
and the outer limits of all maritime 
zones under the national jurisdiction 
of the Marshall Islands—and included 
in this declaration is Wake Island” 
(Johnson 2016). Amending article 
IV, section 2(1) of the RMI Consti-
tution to include Ānen­kio as part 
of the RMI electoral district would 
strengthen this claim.
Although the Constitutional Con-
vention is still in session at the time of 
this writing and the outcome of these 
and other proposals is not yet known, 
President Heine, the Nitijeḷā, and 
local institutions and agencies took 
additional steps during this period 
to advance President Heine’s Agenda 
2020 and, in turn, improve the health 
and well-being of Marshallese com-
munities. For example, several projects 
were undertaken to improve quality 
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of life on Ebjā Island. In March 2017, 
the Kwajalein Atoll Development 
Authority, which oversees social, 
economic, and cultural development 
projects on the atoll, approved fund-
ing for various development projects 
on Ebjā. These included the replace-
ment of power plant generators, 
reconstruction of basketball and tennis 
courts, disaster relief funds for dam-
age incurred by Typhoon Nangka in 
July 2015, and funding for housing 
construction (mij, 31 March 2017). By 
June 2017, several construction proj-
ects were underway or near comple-
tion, including a refurbished dock, 
a new classroom building for Ebeye 
(Ebjā) Public Elementary School, wells 
for the power plant’s forthcoming 
reverse osmosis system, and a new 
boat ramp (mij, 16 June 2017). Also 
during this period, Kuwajleen Atoll 
leaders and RMI government officials 
engaged in talks with the US Army 
about the  possibility of enhancing 
benefits for Marshallese workers on 
Kuwajleen (mij, 21 Oct 2016), and the 
US Army has invited the RMI private 
sector to bid for technical services and 
other contracts on Kuwajleen for the 
first time in the United States’ seven-
decade history on the atoll (mij, 24 
Feb 2016). In an effort to improve 
educational outcomes in Kuwajleen 
Atoll schools, teachers and educa-
tion leaders  gathered on Ebjā in April 
2017 for the first-ever Kwajalein Atoll 
 Education Summit.
Key developments in the areas of 
nuclear justice, health services, disaster 
preparedness, and the  environment 
also pushed the president’s agenda 
 forward during this period. Construc-
tion of the first phase of Mājro’s 
new hospital and surgical ward got 
underway, and the Ministry of Health 
and the Republic of China (Taiwan) 
agreed to allow Marshall Islands 
patients with orthopedic conditions, 
cancer, and heart-related illnesses 
to be referred to Shuang Ho Hospi-
tal in Taiwan for treatment (mij, 21 
April 2017). In December 2016, the 
Marshall Islands Red Cross Soci-
ety (mircs) received an infusion of 
funds from the Nitijeḷā for disaster 
preparedness efforts and administra-
tive functions. Following this boost 
to its budget, the  fledgling society 
took several of the steps required 
to become a member of the Inter-
national Federation of the Red 
Cross. These include hiring its first 
secretary-general in April 2017, who 
quickly launched volunteer recruit-
ment efforts across the country. At 
its first General Assembly in June 
2017, the mircs elected a board of 
governors and announced that it had 
recruited more than 340 volunteers, 
all of whom will receive training in 
first aid and conduct drought surveys, 
disaster preparation, and relief work 
around the islands. Also in April 
2017, the Marshall Islands Marine 
Resources Authority hosted the first 
National Oceans Symposium, bring-
ing together hundreds of elected and 
community leaders, teachers, students, 
and nongovernmental organizations 
to discuss climate change, ocean 
conservation, and sustainability. In 
June 2017, RMI leaders brought 
these issues to the international UN 
Ocean Conference in New York City. 
In the area of nuclear accountability, 
President Heine announced legisla-
tion that would establish a Nuclear 
Commission to develop a strategy 
for achieving nuclear justice for 
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 Marshall Islanders. She also convened 
the “Nuclear Legacy Conference: 
Charting a Journey Toward Justice” 
to commemorate the seventy-first 
anniversary of the 1 March 1954 
Castle Bravo thermonuclear test on 
Pikinni (Bikini) Atoll and to chart a 
course for the future of nuclear justice. 
The conference featured a keynote 
address by Climate Change Ambas-
sador Tony deBrum and brought 
together nuclear survivors, experts, 
and “media representatives to inform 
and create awareness among the 
people of the Marshall Islands, the 
United States, and the world at large, 
and to develop a detailed strategy for 
action and engagement both with the 
United States and with the interna-
tional  community” (RMI Office of the 
President 2017).
Despite the tremendous strides 
taken by President Heine, the Nitijeḷā, 
and many others to improve the lives 
of Marshall Islanders during this 
period, many challenges remain.  
These include high rates of poverty, 
domestic abuse, out-migration, and 
epidemic disease. If President Heine’s 
Agenda 2020, the 2016 legislative 
agenda, and the amendments up for 
consideration by the Constitutional 
Convention are any indication, the 
Marshall Islands will continue to chart 
the course and make headway toward 
a more  positive, healthy, and secure 
future for its citizens in the years to 
come.
The author thanks Joseph Genz, 
Terry Hazzard, Tamera Heine, and 
James Plasman for comments on 
 sections of this review.
monica c labriola
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